Cite as:
Mark Klein, Peyman Faratin, Hiroki Sayama, and Yaneer Bar-Yam, Negotiating complex contracts, Group Decision and Negotiation 12(2): 111–125 (2003).
or: Mark Klein, Peyman Faratin, Hiroki Sayama, and Yaneer Bar-Yam, Negotiating complex contracts, in Proceedings of the AAAI Fall 2001 Symposium on Negotiation Methods for Autonomous Cooperative Systems (2001).
Download PDF (subscription required)
Work to date on computational models of negotiation has focused almost exclusively on defining contracts consisting of one or a few independent issues and tractable contract spaces. Many real-world contracts, by contrast, are much more complex, consisting of multiple inter-dependent issues and intractably large contract spaces. This paper describes a simulated annealing based approach appropriate for negotiating such complex contracts that achieves near-optimal social welfares for negotiations with binary issue dependencies.