Simple negotiating agents in complex games: Emergent equilibria and dominance of strategies


Cite as:

P. Faratin, M. Klein, H. Sayama, and Y. Bar-Yam: Simple negotiating agents in complex games: Emergent equilibria and dominance of strategies, in Intelligent Agent VIII: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2333, 367-377, Springer-Verlag, 2002.

or: P. Faratin, M. Klein, H. Sayama, and Y. Bar-Yam: Simple negotiating agents in complex games: Emergent equilibria and dominance of strategies, Proceedings of the Eighth International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL-2001), 42-53, 2001.


Abstract

We present a simple model of distributed multi-agent multi-issued contract negotiation for open systems where interactions are competitive and information is private and not shared. We then investigate via simulations two different approximate optimization strategies and quantify the contribution and costs of each towards the quality of the solutions reached. To evaluate the role of knowledge the obtained results are compared to more cooperative strategies where agents share more information. Interesting social dilemmas emerge that suggest the design of incentive mechanisms.

 

 

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