[New England
      Complex Systems Institute]
[Home] [Research] [Education] [Current Section: Activities & Events] [Community] [News] [The Complex World] [About Complex Systems] [About NECSI]
International Conference on Complex Systems (ICCS2006)

The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection

Dritan Osmani
Max Planck Research School on Earth System Modelling (IMPRS-

Richard Tol
Director, Research Unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University

     Full text: Not available
     Last modified: May 12, 2006

The non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmen-
tal agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d’Aspremont et al. (1983)
frequently use the assumption that countries can sign a single agreement only. We modify the
assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs. By developing further a model of Bar-
rett (1994a) on a single self-enforcing IEA, we demonstrate that there are many similarities
between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environ-
mental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA works far better than one self-enforcing
IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental equality

Keywords: self-enforcing international environmental agreements, non-cooperative game the-
ory, stability, nonlinear optimization.

JEL: C61, C72, H41

Conference Home   |   Conference Topics   |   Application to Attend
Submit Abstract/Paper   |   Accommodation and Travel   |   Information for Participants

Maintained by NECSI Webmaster    Copyright © 2000-2005 New England Complex Systems Institute. All rights reserved.